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Abstract 
This is a note on corruption and underground economy in a Kaldor-type model of the 
business cycle. It appears that when the economy is booming and underground 
activities seek to enter the official economy, bureaucrats have the upper hand but until 
underground businesses cannot tolerate bureaucrats anymore and start reentering the 
informal sector. This is what checks the growth of the official output and gets it into 
its downward phase. Once in this phase, bureaucrats lose control and just follow 
passively the developments in the economy. At the trough of the contraction, official 
activities reach their nadir whereas the unofficial ones are at their zenith and seek to 
buy whatever has been left from the staggering official businesses. This is what leads 
to recovery in the absence of stabilization policies. 
Resumen 
Esta es una nota sobre la corrupción y la economía oculta en un modelo del  ciclo 
empresarial del tipo de Kaldor. Parece que cuando la economía es fuerte y las 
actividades ocultas buscan  entrar en la economía oficial, los burócratas se encuentran 
en posición dominante, pero sólo hasta que las empresas ocultas no puedan más 
tolerar a los burócratas y empiecen a volver al sector informal. Esto es lo que para el 
crecimiento del producto oficial y lo lleva a una fase de contracción. Apenas empiece 
esta fase, los burócratas pierden el control  y simplemente siguen pasivamente los 
sucesos en la economía. Al fondo de la contracción, las actividades oficiales llegan a 
su punto más bajo, mientras las no oficiales están en su cenit y buscan comprar todo 
lo que queda de las empresas oficiales en dificultad. Esto es lo  que conduce a una 
recuperación en la falta de políticas de estabilización. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the tasks of bureaucracy is “the application of the same provisions to a 
variety of people with different characteristics and the consequent need to use 
‘discretion’…provides scope for corruption” (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, 316). And, 
in so far as the impact of corruption on growth is concerned, “[t]heory is divided… 
[but], the growing consensus based on the empirical literature is that corruption is 
associated with negative growth outcomes” (Bose, 2010). Indeed, there are those who 
like Baretto (2001) maintain that “[c]orruption is positively and significantly 
correlated with growth, implying that corruption has efficiency-enhancing qualities”, 
others at the other end who like Hodge et al. (2009) ascertain that “corruption hinders 
growth through its adverse effects on investment in physical capital, human capital, 
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and political instability”, and in the middle still others like Sindzingre and Milelli 
(2010) who emphasize that “the relationships between corruption and economic 
growth are difficult to demonstrate”. 
At the same time, Choi and Thum (2005), Johnson et al. (1997) and Friedman 
et al. (2000) observe that corruption sends firms to the underground economy, even 
partially Hibbs and Piculescu (2005) would add: “the ‘grabbing hands’ of corrupt 
bureaucrats function… as…‘helping hands’ giving firms the capacity to exploit 
profitable opportunities in the unofficial economy;...the profit maximizing firms may 
operate simultaneously in both the official and unofficial sectors”. Here the consensus 
is unanimous in that “[t]he unofficial economy…mitigates government-induced 
distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official 
sector” (Choi and Thum, 2005, 817). And, specifically about corruption: “the 
presence of the shadow economy may have adverse effects on corruption” (Echazu 
and Bose, 2008, 534). It depends on the course of the business cycle, this paper comes 
to add to these conclusion by employing a version of Chang and Smyth’s (1971) 
approach to Kaldor’s model of cyclical fluctuations with regard to bureaucracy 
corruption and the official sector of the economy.  
 
2. The Analysis 
Let F be investment in the official economy and Q be this economy’s output, 
always being absorbed by the consumer. Such investments presuppose interaction 
with a given body of bureaucrats handling a specific body of regulations, which 
bureaucracy can benefit per se from this interaction by securing for itself income B. 
That is, , with  and ,  (Ndikumana and 
Baliamoune, 2008; Asiedu and Freeman, 2009; Hodge et al. 2009) and B changes 
according to the difference between the planned official investment and the actual 
one, Φ. Writing Φ as a percentage φ of B as a technical matter to match the 
mathematics of Kaldor’s model, the change in B, , is: 
 
Nevertheless, investments in the unofficial sector are absolved from the 
burden of B and are decided when more than Q is demanded, which is always the case 
regardless the phase of the cycle; i.e. , with . The change in Q, 
, depends on the difference (F−H) and more precisely, on the speed of adjustment of 
official investment to the unofficial one that the excess demand has prompted: 
, where s is the adjustment speed parameter.  depends not only on the 
responsiveness of F to increased consumer demand, but also on its adjustment to 
some exponentially increasing autonomous demand, , so that: 
  
where t is time. That is, the shadow economy is treated as a leakage out of the official 
economy like exactly savings in Kaldor’s model but under the paradox of thrift.  
Noting next that  and , the model becomes: 
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and             
Under the stationary state of , these two equations give that: 
                                            
with            
 
One would expect this derivative to be always negative. And, it is, because 
 rendering thereby the numerator negative since 
. 
But, it is so once steady state is disturbed. To see the relationship between q and b 
when already at disequilibrium, one has to check the path of the trajectories (Chang 
and Smyth, 1971).  
Figure 1 illustrates that they point to a sort of limit cycle depicted by Figure 2 where 
the dark line corresponds to the cycle of b, as follows: Both q and b decline during the 
downward phase until the trough Γ is reached; shrinking official output and 
investment weaken the revenue basis of bureaucrats. This trend of q and b is reversed 
by recovery until point Θ on steady state q line, after which point they start following 
opposite trends until points Λ-Λ΄; q continues increasing peaking at Λ under a slowly 
declining b.  
4 
 
It is this only part of the cycle that (5) captures, but the negative relationship 
between q and b in this part does suggest that bureaucracy checks official output 
growth as follows. A declining b does not imply a declining B too on this part; B 
continues rising ex hypothesi until point Λ, but at a declining rate, and starts 
decreasing along with b only once that point is left behind. But, equally ex hypothesi, 
unofficial activities choose to come to light in this booming, phase of the cycle, 
starting reconsidering this decision in view of the increasing B as Λ is approached, 
and reversing it once Λ is reached. Bureaucracy checks the official economy and the 
unofficial economy checks bureaucracy exactly from this point of view.  
It appears that when the economy is booming and underground activities seek 
to enter the official economy, bureaucrats have the upper hand but until point Λ, after 
which formerly underground businesses cannot tolerate bureaucrats and start 
reentering the informal sector. This is what checks the growth of the official output 
and gets it into its downward phase. Once in this phase, bureaucrats lose control and 
just follow passively the developments in the economy. At the trough of the 
contraction, point Γ, official activities reach their nadir whereas the unofficial ones 
are at their zenith and seek to buy whatever has been left from the staggering official 
businesses. This is what leads to recovery in the absence of stabilization policies. 
Bureaucracy benefits from this development too, but continues being passive until 
steady state q is reached. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
What is the autonomous demand, D? It is certainly the demand by the public 
sector. When Jean Baptiste Colbert enacted what de Gournay would call later 
bureaucratie (Starbuck, 2003), he did it in order to put order in the anarchy of a 
mostly “undeclared” we might say today, economy, and tax it to the benefit of the 
well-known extravagances of Louis XIV (1643-1715) (Wolf, 1968), serving later 
under Louis XV (1715–1774) and Louis XVI (1774–1793), a France being “plagued 
by ruinously expensive warfare along with economic instability” (McElroy, 2010). So, 
was Colbert right? This is really the question the vast literature on corruption has been 
trying to answer while the attention on underground economy connotes the 
weaknesses of the public sector in general.  
This tract did hopefully help towards an understanding of this matter from this 
broader perspective, too. It seems to suggest that calling for an invisible-hand minded 
minarch state is equivalent to calling for officializing the unofficial economy or 
unofficializing the official one. What bureaucracy does is to be keeping the two 
distinct and getting paid officially and unofficially for it. But, that’s important once 
the need for a regulatory regime and broader public sector is recognized. Equally 
important as to be controlling rather than combating unofficial economy so that it can 
be checking the excesses of bureaucrats. In any case, given the circumstances of 
Colbert’s France, it appears that he was right… 
References 
Asiedu, E., Freeman, J., 2009. The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: 
Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition 
Countries. Rev. Dev. Econ. 13, 200-214. 
5 
 
Barreto, R.A., 2001. Endogenous Corruption, Inequality and Growth: Econometric 
Evidence. University of Adelaide, School of Economics Working Paper 2001-02, 
http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2001-02.pdf 
Bose, N., 2010. Corruption and Economic Growth, in: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. 
(Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 03 June 2014 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2010_C000616> 
doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1925 
Choi, J.P., Thum, M.P., 2005. Corruption and the Shadow Economy. Int. Econ. Rev. 
46, 817-836. 
Echazu, L., Bose, P., 2008. Corruption, Centralization, and the Shadow Economy. 
Southern Econ. J. 75, 524-537. 
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P., 2000. Dodging the 
Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries. J. Public 
Econ. 76, 459-493. 
Hibbs, Douglas A. Jr. and Violeta Piculescu, (2005), “Institutions, Corruption and 
Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy”, Göteborg University Working Paper, 
http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/0508/0508003.pdf 
Hodge, Andrew, Sriram Shankar, D.S. Prasada Rao and Leslie Alan Duhs, (2009), 
“Exploring the Links between Corruption and Growth”, University of Queensland 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 392, 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/392.pdf 
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, and A. Shleifer, (1997), “The Unofficial Economy in 
Transition”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 159-239. 
McElroy, Wendy, (2010), “The Physiocrats”, The Future of Freedom Foundation 
Articles, http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/physiocrats/ 
Ndikumana, Leonce and Mina N. Baliamounek, (2008), “Corruption and Growth: 
Exploring the Investment Channel”, UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 
2008-08, 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=econ_work
ingpaper 
Sindzingre, Alice N. and Christian Milelli, (2010), “The Uncertain Relationship 
between Corruption and Growth in Developing Countries: Threshold Effects and 
State Effectiveness”, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX 
Working Paper 2010-10, http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2010/WP_EcoX_2010-10.pdf 
Starbuck, William H., (2003), “The Origins of Organization Theory”, in Haridimos 
Tsoukas and Christian Knudsen (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Organization 
Theory, Chapter 5, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Wolf, John B., (1968), Louis XIV, Norton, New York. 
